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ASYMMETRKCAL
APPROACH TO
THE PROBLEM
PEREMPTORKES?
by Richard D. Friedman
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, and the extension ofBatson to parties other than prosecutors,
may be expected to put pressure on the institution of peremptory challenges. In this article, Professor Richard
Friedman contends that peremptories for criminal defendants serve important values of our criminal justice
system. He then argues that peremptories for prosecutors are not as important, and that it may no longer be
worthwhile to maintain them in a system of peremptories consistent with Batson. Friedman concludes that the
asymmetry of allowing peremptories in a criminal case only for the accused is not troublesome.

In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution forbids a criminal prosecutor
to exercise peremptory challenges to potential jurors in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson raised a host of
important issues. Most obvious, perhaps, was the question of whether the prohibition of Batson would be extended
to litigating parties other than a criminal prosecutor. In its last two terms, the Court has answered that question
resoundingly. In 1991, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court extended Batson to civillitigants. And
in 1992, the Court completed the circle, holding in Georgia v. McCollum that neither may criminal defendants
exercise peremptories in a racially discriminatory manner.
Thus, the question of who is bound by Batson seems to have been pretty much resolved in a couple of broad
brush strokes. But other problems and complexities remain, and they are sure to put pressure on the continued
maintenance of the institution of peremptory challenges itself. Indeed, in McColl um Justice Thomas, concurring,
predicted dolefully that the death of peremptories was inevitable. To many, though, that would be a welcome
development. Concurring in Batson, Justice Thomas' predecessor, Justice Marshall, advocated the abolition of
peremptories. And recently, three judges of the New York Court of Appeals - one shy ofa majority on the highest
court in the state - endorsed the same idea.
There is, however, another, somewhat more moderate, possibility, which may at first sound slightly odd,
though in fact it has deep historical roots: retention of the accused's peremptories but elimination of the
prosecution's.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The historical
background suggests
that, although
peremptories now are
provided to both sides
in both civil and
criminal litigation,
they exist principally
for the benefit of
criminal defendants.

Although peremptory challenges in civil cases appear to be a relatively recent
creation, in criminal cases they are very old. The common law was generous in its
provision of peremptories to criminal defendants - allowing them 35, later reduced
except in cases of high treason to 20. The allowance of peremptory challenges was
extolled by Blackstone as "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners
for which our English laws are justly famous."
But by a statute of 1305, enacted to correct a pro-prosecution bias in the selection of
jurors, peremptory challenges were denied to the king's attorneys. This prohibition was
only marginally effective, because prosecutors were allowed to require a member of the
venire to "stand aside," giving a reason only if a jury of twelve could not be selected.
The "standing aside" procedure did not find quick or universal acceptance in the
United States, however. This resistance appears to be attributable to the same perception that led to the constitutionalization of the jury right - the perception of the jury as
an essential bulwark against state oppression. Thus, it was not until 1919 that Virginia
allowed prosecutors any form of peremptory challenge. In 1856, the United States
Supreme Court held, pursuant to statute, that federal courts should follow the procedure
with respect to prosecutors' peremptories of the state in which they sat. But through the
nineteenth century, as the mistrust of government characteristic of the Revolutionary era
gave way to increasing acceptance of state power, peremptories for the prosecution
gradually became the rule rather than the exception.
Even today, prosecutors are not always given the same number of peremptories as
the accused. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b ), for example, in noncapital felony cases the accused is given ten peremptories and the Government only six.
And statutes in seventeen states provide more peremptories to the accused than to the
prosecution in at least ~ome criminal prosecutions. Local practices may add more
asymmetries.

PEREMPTORIES FOR THE
ACCUSED: "TENDERNESS AND
HUMANITY," ltE*~-G
AND EFFICIENCY AND THE
PERCEPTION OF FAIRNESS
The historical background suggests that, although peremptories now are provided to
both sides in both civil and criminal litigation, they exist principally for the benefit of
criminal defendants. The value of the accused's peremptories may be assessed by
comparing the status quo with the situation that would prevail if they did not exist.
Presumably more liberal granting of challenges for cause would take up some of the
slack caused by elimination of the accused's peremptories. Nevertheless, for several
reasons it is far preferable to retain the accused's peremptories.
Perhaps most obviously, even if the standard for a cause challenge is lowered, a
biased juror will very often escape it. Largely for this reason, Justice Thomas, though
concurring in McCollum, purportedly on the ground of stare decisis, expressed grave
misgivings: "I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that this court
ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory
strikes .... Today's decision, while protecting jurors, leaves defendants with less means
of protecting themselves. Unless jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire,
defendants generally must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will
affect the verdict."
Indeed, in some cases, an accused may reasonably conclude on the basis of one or
more aspects of a potential juror's background or attitudes that she is less likely than the
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potential juror next in line to find in favor of the accused. Such a probabilistic judgment is an appropriate basis on which to exercise a peremptory challenge, and it will
weed out some biased jurors. In most cases, though, it cannot support a challenge for
cause - unless the standard for a cause challenge is eased so much as to sap it of
virtually all meaning.
The point should not be overstated: It is probably relatively rare that the availability
of peremptories actually prevents an inaccurate verdict. Empirical research suggests
that attorneys, despite extensive efforts, and even aided by "scientific" selection
methods, actually tend in most cases to have only modest success in identifying jurors
inclined to find adversely. And even where the attorney is able to identify hostile
jurors, in most cases it is unlikely that the use of peremptories will prevent an inaccurate
verdict. After all, a peremptory does not prevent the inclusion of a biased juror unless
the attorney identifies the juror as relatively hostile and a challenge for cause fails (or
would fail if made). And even if in a given case the exercise of peremptories does
prevent the inclusion of one or more biased jurors, it still may be unlikely that denial of
peremptories would lead to an inaccurate result; at least where jury unanimity is
required, the inclusion of one or a few biased jurors is probably more likely to cause a
hung jury than to transform an accurate verdict into an inaccurate one.
But, even if peremptories are of only occasional importance in contributing to fairness
itself, they are of consistent, though not as dramatic, importance in contributing to the
perception of fairness. No system of challenges for cause can serve as well as
peremptories can the crucial function of giving the accused a strong sense that his jury is
fair. As Blackstone noted, the accused may be suspicious of a juror "even without being
able to assign a reason." Or perhaps the accused knows the reason but is not able to
persuade the judge that it amounts to good cause; it may be that the accused is engaging in
what Professor William Pizzi has rightly called "comparison shopping," and believes that
the juror belongs to a group that, as a statistical matter, is significantly less likely than the
average run of jurors to find in his favor. The value of peremptory challenges lies precisely
in their peremptoriness - that the accused can remove a potential juror whom he suspects
would be biased against him (or merely less likely to vote for acquittal than the next
potential juror) without having to persuade anyone. Peremptories thus help remove even
grounds of suspicion that are weak or that would be difficult or embarrassing for the
accused to articulate or for the judicial system to assess.
Given the nature of a criminal trial, in which the state attempts to deprive an individual of liberty (or even of life), increasing not only the actuality of fairness but also
the accused's perception of fairness is a particularly crucial goal. Punishment by the
state is more easily justifiable when that perception is a strong one. This consideration
is especially important when the accused is particularly vulnerable to oppression by the
state and prejudice by portions of the populace - and, as suggested by Justice Thomas
in McCollum, that may be when peremptories serve their most important purpose.
The accused's peremptories have other, subsidiary benefits as well. To develop a
challenge for cause often requires extensive questioning of a juror, and as Blackstone
pointed out, "the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment." The problem is inevitable, but making the system more dependent on challenges
for cause would aggravate it.
Finally, in some cases peremptories offer efficiency benefits. Occasionally, the
exercise of a peremptory may keep off the jury an outlier, someone who would not
persuade her colleagues but who might through sheer stubbornness or conviction cause
a hung jury. Moreover, challenges for cause are more expensive to administer than are
peremptory challenges. Not only must groundwork be laid in questioning, but an
argument must be made to the judge, who must rule, and if the ruling is against the
accused an appeal is possible.
Peremptories, by contrast - to the extent they are allowed to be truly peremptory are about as simple to administer as could be. The importance of this consideration is
mitigated, but not eliminated, by the fact that, so long as the accused does not have a
surplus of them, he has a strong incentive to develop a challenge for cause against a
juror whom he wishes to exclude, thus saving one of his peremptories.

The point should not
be overstated: It is
probably relatively
rare that the
availability of
peremptories actually
prevents an
inaccurate verdict.
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PEREMPTORIES FOR THE
PROSECUTOR: IS THE GAME
WORTH THE CANDLE?

Batson has mitigated,
though hardly
eliminated, one serious
aspect of this problemthe tendency for
prosecutors to use
peremptories
discriminatorily
against potential jurors
from minority ethnic
groups.
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The prosecutor's peremptories stand on weaker ground than do the accused's.
Indeed, as the historical background has indicated, during much of the last 700 years or
so, peremptories have not been as firmly established for prosecutors as for criminal
defendants. I think there is good reason for this: The crucial function of increasing the
accused's perception of fairness is not served by prosecutors' peremptories. Indeed,
that function will be disserved to the extent that the prosecutor uses her peremptories to
exclude jurors who, though apparently fair-minded, have backgrounds and attitudes
suggesting that they are more likely than the average member of the community to find
in favor of the accused.
Batson has mitigated, though hardly eliminated, one serious aspect of this problemthe tendency for prosecutors to use peremptories discriminatorily against potential
jurors from minority ethnic groups. At the same time, however, Batson has created a
serious disadvantage of another type: It has made prosecutors' peremptories a frightfully expensive procedural nightmare. Batson has meant that very often the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptories threatens to append a mini-case of discrimination
onto the criminal trial. (This is particularly so where the accused is a member of a
minority group, but even in some cases where he is not, in Powers v. Ohio, the Court
held that the accused, a white man on trial for murder, had standing to object to the
prosecutor's use ofperemptories to exclude blackjurors.) And the discrimination case
is not so easily resolved.
In some cases, the Court must first determine whether the group assertedly excluded
is cognizable under the-Batson doctrine. If the prosecutor excludes blacks or Hispanics
willy-nilly, that will run afoul of Batson, but presumably if she does the same to
plumbers or pipefitters that will not. What if she excludes people whose names sound
Italian? The cases seem to be in conflict. Conflicts such as this one may be resolved in
time, but new ones are sure to arise as courts test the outer reaches of Batson. One
court, for example, has applied Batson to disallow a peremptory challenge of a hearingimpaired juror. The possibilities are seemingly endless. Suppose the prosecution in a
rape trial challenges young men. Is that covered? I know of no cases as yet, but no
doubt there will be.
If the Court determines that the discrimination alleged is the type covered by Batson,
it must then determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination is made out.
According to the New York Court of Appeals, "[t]here are no fixed rules" for answering
this question; the statistics of whom the prosecutor challenges and whom she accepts
are helpful, but not conclusive, especially when the accused's objection is to a single
peremptory challenge. Such factors as "objective facts indicating that the prosecutor
has challenged members of a particular racial group who might be expected to favor the
prosecution because of their backgrounds" must also be taken into account.
There is a slightly bizarre aspect to this consideration, though it may be inevitable
given Batson. In exercising peremptories, the prosecutor is not only allowed to but
expected to adhere to generalizations based on the background of a potential juror - but
the prosecutor must disregard one crucial facet of the potential juror's background, her
race, that may have affected her life and perspective more strongly than any, or nearly
any, other.
If the Court does find a prima facie case of discrimination, the sideshow is not over,
because the prosecutor has the opportunity to demonstrate that she really exercised the
peremptories on a permissible basis. Suppose that the accused is Hispanic, and that
much of the testimony will be in Spanish. Can the prosecutor defend her peremptory
challenges of Spanish-speaking jurors by expressing fear that they will follow their own
understanding of the testimony rather than the official translation? The Supreme Court
has allowed one prosecutor to get by with that explanation, even while suggesting that it

might not fly in the future. It is difficult to know which this decision puts in the most
unfavorable light- the judicial exaltation of the translation over the actual testimony,
the Batson rule, or peremptories themselves.
If the Court does find a Batson violation, it must grant an appropriate remedy;
sometimes it may be feasible for the Court to order the seating of jurors who had
previously been excused, but sometimes it is necessary to dismiss the entire panel and
start anew.
Finally, if in the end the trial court decides there is no Batson violation, the accused
may appeal on that issue. Unless the appeal is interlocutory - which requires a
postponement of trial -the only effective remedy, if the appellate court determines that
there has been a violation, is a retrial.
Small wonder that, as Professor Pizzi has said, "[i]f one wanted to understand how
the American trial system for criminal cases came to be the most expensive and timeconsuming in the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point than Batson."
Sometimes, the prosecutor's own interests might encourage restraint in exercising
peremptories, so that she does not add unnecessary complexity to the case. But the
prosecutor eager to secure a conviction cannot be expected reliably to take into account
the full impact on the judicial system of her exercise of peremptories.
The complexities that have stemmed from Batson are, I believe, virtually inevitable
in a system that gives the prosecution peremptory challenges subject to the qualification
that a limited set of grounds for their exercise is impermissible. The qualification could
be removed only if Batson were overruled. That prospect, however, is both unappealing
and extremely unlikely. The question then becomes whether the supposed benefits of
prosecutors' peremptories are great enough to make the considerable costs worthwhile;
Batson has so fundamentally altered the nature of prosecutors' peremptories that inertia
alone should not justify their retention.
Prosecutors' peremptories do presumably occasionally prevent-inaccurate verdicts,
but for reasons discussed above this is probably a relatively rare occurrence. Allowing
the prosecutor to challenge a juror peremptorily might also, in some cases, prevent the
perception of unfairness to the prosecution, but this is not nearly so important as
preventing the perception of unfairness to the accused.
Prosecutors' peremptories might also offer some benefits comparable to the subsidiary benefits of the accused's peremptories. But these do not seem weighty enough to
warrant retaining them. And neither, I shall now argue, should any concern about
altering the balance of litigation.

If the Court does find
a Batson violation, it
must grant an
appropriate remedy;
sometimes it may be
feasible for the Court
to order the seating of
jurors who had
previously been
excused, but
sometimes it is
necessary to dismiss
the entire panel and
start anew.

PUTTING IT TOGETHER:
THENONPROBLEM OF ASYMMETRY
So far I have argued that it is important to preserve peremptories for the accused and
suggested that it may be wise to eliminate them for the prosecutor. Putting these ideas
together is sure to raise objections of asymmetry. I do not believe these objections are
troublesome.
For one thing, as I have pointed out, the allocation of peremptories is already
asymmetrical in federal courts and in a substantial number of states. Eliminating
peremptories for the prosecution altogether would expand and accentuate an already
existing asymmetry, not create a new one.
More fundamentally, it is important to bear in mind that criminal trials are not about
even-handedness. In various ways, we create asymmetries to protect important rights of
the accused. Most obviously, the accused is presumed innocent, and only proof beyond
a reasonable doubt will suffice to convict; if, after all the evidence is in, the jury is in
equipoise, or even thinks that guilt is substantially, but not overwhelmingly, probable, it
must return a verdict of not guilty.
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Other asymmetries can also be crucial. The prosecution is obligated to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence to the accused, but the accused has no obligation to
disclose inculpatory evidence to the prosecution. The accused can decide to testify, but the
prosecution cannot compel him to. The accused can put his character into issue, to show
that he was not a person likely to commit the crime charged, but unless he does so the
prosecution cannot attempt to show that he was such a person. Similarly, in some cases,
only the accused can decide whether to raise questions about the character of the purported
victim, such as by bolstering a contention of self-defense by showing that the supposed
victim is a violent person. And in some circumstances the accused's right to confront
witnesses against him under the sixth amendment to the Constitution gives him the right to
override an evidentiary objection of the type that would bind the prosecution.
As compared to a symmetrical rule, each of these asymmetries alters the results of
the fact-finding process in favor of the accused. To a large extent, though, that is
desirable. Blackstone's statement that it is better to let ten guilty defendants go free than
to convict one innocent one may be a cliche, but it only became one because it expresses a fundamental value. The principal expression of that value in our criminal law
system is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which, as compared to a
more-likely-than-not standard, prevents some fact-finding errors against the accused at
the price of creating far more fact-finding errors in favor of the accused- a trade-off
that we find easily worthwhile.
Thus, even if an asymmetrical rule on peremptories led to a substantially greater
number of pro-accused errors as compared to those that would be yielded by a symmetrical rule (either both sides or neither side having peremptories), that would not be
enough to condemn the asymmetrical rule. We would first have to ask whether the
corresponding reduction in anti-accused errors is great enough to make the change a net
improvement in the truth-determining process, given that anti-accused errors are far
more important than p~-accused errors. There is no way of knowing for sure, but it
seems unlikely that the increase in pro-accused errors would be so many times greater
than the increase in anti-accused errors to make the trade-off a bad one.
Moreover, even if the ratio of these two effects does work to the disadvantage of the
asymmetrical rule, it is unlikely that the magnitude of the increase in pro-accused errors
would be so great as to be not only a significant concern, but to outweigh in importance
the efficiency of denying peremptories to the prosecution or the perceptional value of
maintaining them for the accused.

A RUMINATION !tat:-~
Richard D. Friedman

There is a strong case for maintaining peremptories for the accused. Perhaps the
case can be made for retaining prosecutors' peremptories, but this is doubtful - and it
does not seem that the case can be made on the ground of symmetry. So this presents
the possibility of an asymmetrical solution, in which the accused but not the prosecutor
may challenge potential jurors peremptorily. And that leads one to wonder whether
McCollum would have come out the way it had if there were no prosecutors'
peremptories. Would the Court have been tempted to limit the accused's exercise of his
peremptories? The best guess - and it can only be that- is that the Court would have
let the accused's peremptories remain truly peremptory.

(Editor's note: This essay is adapted- without footnotes-from Professor Friedman's
article of the same title, 28 Criminal LJ:iw Bulletin 507 (Nov.-Dec. 1992). For a copy of
citations for this essay, please contact the editor, LJ:iw Quadrangle Notes.)
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